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PFECS95-0005.1. Introduction
To understand the process of financial integration and convergence in Europe, it is
necessary to know more about the competitiveness and the efficiency of banks in different
European countries. However, cross-countries comparisons have to take into account the
potential differences coming from some country-specific aspects of the banking technology,
on one hand, and from the environmental and regulatory conditions, on the other hand. In
particular, the economic environment are likely to differ significantly across countries and
these differences could induce important differences of bank efficiency through different
channels. For instance, differences of the income per capita, or differences of the density
of population across countries could produce significant
household’s demand for banking products and services.
differences in the nature of the
In this paper, we focus on two countries, France and Spain, and we try to deepen
the analysis of the influence of the environment conditions on the cost efficiency of the
French and Spanish banking industries. As pointed out by Berger and Humphrey (1996),
this issue is not addressed in the international banking efficiency literature. From our point
of view, cross-country comparison of efficiency requires to define properly a common
frontier which incorporates the country-specific environmental conditions. Moreover, the
integration of environmental variables in the analysis would allow to verify the degree of
similarity between banking technology.
Three categories of environmental variables are taken into account: the main
macroeconomic which determine the banking products demand characteristics conditions,
the structure and regulation of the banking industry, and the accessibility of banking
services.
Our results suggest that, before the introduction of environmental variables, the cost
efficiency scores of Spanish banks were quite low, compared to those of the French banks.
However, when the environmental variables were included in the model, the differences
between the two countries banking industries reduced significantly. So, our results
2demonstrate that the environmental variables appear to play a significant role in the
explanation of the different efficiency scores between the two countries. More precisely,
our results show that the Spanish banks seem to suffer excess costs, or structural
disadvantages, in order to adjust to some environmental compared to French banks, such
as the lower density of population, the lower income level of their customers or the lower
rate of financial intermediation.
A brief survey of the previous literature about cross-country comparisons of
efficiency is presented in Section 2. The methodology for evaluating the cross-country
efficiency when the particular environmental conditions of each country are taken in
account is presented in Section 3. The data and the specification of inputs, outputs and
environmental variables are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results,
and, finally, we provide some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Previous literature in international comparison of banking efficiency
In anticipation of the expected lowering of barriers to competition among financial
institutions within the European Monetary Union (EMU), many EMU countries have
recently experienced consolidation of their domestic banking industry. One reason for this
consolidation is the belief that larger banks will be better able to adjust to the needs of the
customers when they will be allowed to set up branches in any other country, subject only
to the regulations of their home country. As domestic markets become more competitive,
current differences in costs and productive efficiency among the banking industries of EMU
countries will largely determine each country banking structure and future competitive
viability. Thus, it is important to know how different or similar are current banking costs
and productive efficiency between countries in order to predict
increase in cross-border competition.
There appears to be only six studies in the efficiency
the effects of the expected
literature that attempts to
determine and compare banking performances differences across-countries. Four of them
3used nonparametric approaches while two used parametric approaches. In Berg, Forsund,
Hjalmarson, and Suominen (1993), DEA analysis were relied upon to capture the
differences in efficiency between Norway, Sweden, and Finland, first by defining separate
frontiers for each country and comparing the countries pairwise based on each country’s
frontier; and then defining a “common” frontier for doing the comparison among countries.
Berg, Bukh and Forsund (1995) follow up the study by adding Denmark to the countries
sample. The same four countries were investigated in Bergendahl (1995), using mixed
optimal strategy for defining the efficient frontier.
Fecher and Pestieau (1993) and Pastor, Perez, and Quesada (1995) applied DFA and
DEA analysis to 11 OECD countries and 8 developed countries, respectively. The two
studies pooled the cross-country data in order to define a common frontier. The former
study found reverse results to these obtained by the Berg and al., and Bukh and al. studies
taking the same set of countries.
1
Allen and Rai (1996) by using DFA and SFA carry out a systematic comparison of
X-inefficiency measures across 15 developed countries distinguished by different regulatory
environments. To do so, the countries were classified, previously, into two groups --
universal and separated banking countries, respectively--delineated by their regulatory
environment. Universal banking countries permit the functional integration of commercial
and investment banking while separated banking countries do not. Once the inefficiency
levels of those groups of banks were measured, the regularities in the inefficiency measures
were investigated by regressing the firm specific inefficiency measures against various bank
and market characteristics.
The main caveat of these cross-country studies is that the common frontier is
built under the belief that the differences in efficiency across countries only come from
1See Berger and Humphrey (1996) for giving the details of the methodologies and results obtained on
those studies.
4bank managerial decisions.
2 That is, they are assuming that the mean difference in
efficiency is located in differences of technologies. However, it is possible that the
underlying technologies of the banking services productions in Europe and other developed
countries are quite similar. Thus, the differences in efficiency across countries have to take
into account the way in which banking services are produced. This production process is
determined by country-specific differences—that are almost always excluded from cost and
efficiency analyses—and not only by technology differences. Just as different relative
prices of capital and labor inputs will result in different intensity of the use of these inputs
in the production process, if the bank minimize costs and if the technology is constant,
different national environments will result in different observed inputs, liabilities, and assets
mixes and number of branches, again if the technology for producing banking services is
constant. If the country-specific variables are an important factor in the explanation of the
efficiency differences, then the frontier we obtain if we neglect this factor will generate an
overestimation of the inefficiency levels.
3
If the regulatory and economic environments faced by financial institutions are
likely to differ importantly across countries, the cross-country comparisons of the preceding
papers are difficult to interpret. It is because in these papers the specification of the
common frontier is not correct due to the fact that they do not take into account the
influence of the country-specific environmental variables that will justify the use of a
common frontier in cross-country comparisons of efficiency.
and
Here, we propose to compare the cost efficiency of the banking industries in France
Spain, introducing in the cost frontier estimations the appropriate environmental
2Although Allen and Rai’s paper takes into account the regulatory environments in the distinction
between groups of countries in order to compare the inefficiency levels, they specified banks variables and
not country variables in order to explain the differences in efficiency.
3Pastor et al., 1995, did corrections on efficiency measures by introducing the services provided to
customers by the branch network and the degree of solvency determined by the capital ratio. Although it is
well known that adding a restriction when it is using DEA increases (or leaves unaltered) the efficiency of
all and every bank in the sample, they found that the relative efficiency of the countries banks improved.
So, the economic environment of each country is an important explanation of the inefficiencies differences
across countries and their integration will permit to avoid that the choice of the technology base influences
the results when a common technology base is used for comparisons between countries.
5variables, so that the cross countries comparisons of efficiency would not be determined
by the technology of one of the countries. That is, our goal is to permit the proper
comparison of banking efficiency across countries by using a global best-practice
econometric frontier, from which the banks in each country would be compared against the
same standard.
3. Methodology
The technology of the banks can be defined as the set of the specific methods that
the banks use to combine financial and physical inputs in order to produce a certain amount
of banking services, such as liquidity and payment services, portfolio services, loans
services. Those methods are diversification, pooling of risk, financial information collection
and evaluation, risk management, and so on.
More or less, the methods used by banks are the same in large industrial countries.
So, there is a presumption that the technology should be the same in countries like France
and Spain. However, the environmental conditions faced by financial institutions are likely
to differ importantly. For instance, the average level of wealth, and the saving behavior of
economic agents could be different in countries like France and Spain. The differences in
the taxation of saving products could persist across countries in Europe, even if banks could
now supply the same products all around Europe. The bankruptcy loan is still different
from one country to another, so that the efficiency of the loans contracts differs across
countries, and so on.
With the aim of addressing the deficiencies found in the methodology applied in the
intercountry efficiency comparisons that exist in the literature, we propose here an
alternative methodology. In this alternative methodology, the specific environmental
conditions of each country play an important role in the definition and specification of the
common frontier of different countries.
6Common frontier and international comparisons: control for technology
As we pointed out above, we will consider that the differences in efficiency
between the banking industries of France and Spain are largely determined by country-
specific differences, more than by technology differences. So, the first step of the analysis,
in our alternative methodology, is to verify whether, or not, the technology is the same in
the two banking industries.
We test the similarity between banking technologies by introducing country-specific
environmental variables. The reason is that we assume that these variables are major factors
explaining the differences of the banking costs across countries. So, we need to identify
properly these variables in order to be able to identify the complete set of factors which
influence the banking costs.
The simple test we used is the following. In a first step, we specify and estimate
separate cost functions for each country—in our particular case we have two equations, one
for France and one for Spain—including the environmental variables as control variables.
The two equations model is the following:
(1)
where, C is the cost vector; Y is the output vector; P is the input prices vector; Z is the
vector of country-specific variables—these variables will take equal value for each bank
of each country by year: i=l,...,n, is the index of banks; t=l,...,T, refers to years; and c=1,
2, refers to the two countries.
In order to test the similarity of technologies, we impose cross-equation equality
restrictions on each parameter of each country cost frontier, but such restrictions were not
imposed on the parameters of the country-specific environmental variables.
4 These
4For the estimation of these two cost equations we used a subset of banks belonging to each country.
We choose these banks in terms of their efficiency levels. That is, first we estimated the internal efficiency
of the banking industry of each country using DFA and then we selected the most efficient banks in each
country in such a manner that each subset of bank for each country has the same number of observations.
This was necessary in order to impose the cross-equations restrictions.
7restrictions permit to define properly the set of environmental variables which explain the
differences in banking costs across countries, as well as to identify the underlying common
banking technology that exists in the banking industries of the two countries we consider.
Indeed, if most or all of the cross-equation equality restrictions on the technology
parameters are insignificant, then we will have identified the correct set of country-specific
environmental variables which determine costs, and, by the same way, the common
underlying banking technology of different countries.
After having identified the common frontier, the bank efficiency for each
can be measured. To do this, a common stochastic cost frontier is estimated,
country
holding
constant the country-specific environmental factors at their respective mean values for each
country:
(2)
The international comparison proposed here will permit the proper comparison of
banking efficiency across countries, namely one that is not influenced by the technology
of the benchmark country.
Cost specification and Distribution-free model
In this study, estimates of X-efficiency for Spanish and French banking industries
were generated using the DFA. The DFA specifies a functional form for the frontier and
separates the specific distributions for the inefficiencies and random errors. We used a
translog specification and estimated separate cost functions for each of the five years 1988
to 1992 for the country cost frontiers as well as for the common frontier. We estimated the
cost frontier jointly with the factor share equations obtained by applying Shephard’s
lemma.
5 Thus, the complete model was the following:
5However as noted by Berger (1993), forcing the shares to be consistent with the cost equation implies
that the input mix reacts consistently to relative prices changes, that is that X-inefficiencies are only technical
in nature. This assumption is probably too strong, although the introduction of the factor share equations
surely improve the precision of the estimates. So, we ran the model alternatively with OLS and with iterative
SUR without restrictions on the constant terms in the share equations and the results were very similar.
8(3)
(4)
In this model, C represents the total of operating and financial (interests) costs.
6 The Yj
(j=l,2,3) represent the banking products. The Pm (m=l,2,3) refer to the input prices.
7 Sm
are the share of costs paid to input m.
8 The term lnx is the systematic error component
The banking outputs and inputs used in this study are as result of following the
value added approach of Berger and Humphrey (1992). In the value added approach, all
items on both sides of the balance sheet may be identified as outputs or inputs depending
on their contribution to the generation of bank value added. Accordingly, we specified three
variable outputs: loans (composed of the value of home loans and other loans), produced
deposits (the sum of demand, saving, and time deposits), and other productive assets (the
sum of all existing deposits with banks, short-term investments, and other investments).
Prices for three variable inputs were also specified: labor, physical capital, and deposits
(capturing the interest cost of deposits).
The prices of inputs were computed by using the data of the banks themselves. For
6That assumes that the banks try to minimize total costs and not only to minimize operating costs.
7The definition of the estimated common cost frontier corresponds to the equation system (3)-(4), where
the equation (3) contains as additional dependent variables the vector of country-specific variables pointed
in the equation (2).
8The share equations sum to one, so the physical capital share equation was omitted from the estimation.
9Standard symetry and input prices homogeneity constraints are imposed on the total cost function (3).
9instance, the price of labor was estimated by using the information relative to the wages
and taxes associated to the use of labor as they appeared in the banks accounts.
Consequently, because we used the prices paid by bank for each factor of production,
inefficiencies associated with overpayments to real or financial factors can not be evaluated
by our approach. That could be a source of underestimation of the inefficiencies for banks
paying factors at higher prices than the market prices.
To compute inefficiencies by using DFA the estimate of inefficiency for each firm
in a panel data set is determined as the difference between the average residual of each
firm and the average residual of the firm on the frontier. That is, the average of the annual
residuals for each bank i is computed and it served as an estimate of lnxi for that bank,
average residual of each bank i is used in the computation of X-efficiency. The efficiency
score is given by the following equation:
average cost residual which is assumed to be the completely efficient bank. Therefore, X-
EFF is an estimate of the ratio of predicted costs for the most efficient bank to predicted
costs for any bank. It is just like measuring X-efficiency by the ratio of predicted costs for
the most efficient bank to predicted costs for each bank. Nevertheless, this measure of
other fully during the period. As noted by Berger (1993), this error is likely to be larger
for banks near the extremes of the average residual. These banks may have experienced
good (bad) luck over the entire period. Consequently, the minimum average residual, which
serves here as a benchmark for the calculus of the X-efficiency, could be overestimated.
To treat this problem, we have computed truncated measures of X-efficiency, where the
value of average residual of the qth ((1-q)th) quantile was given to each observation for
which the value of the average residual is below (above) the qth ((1-q)th) quantile value.
We have used three values of q: 1%, 5%, and 25%.
104. The Data and Variables
Data.
The data are annual accounting data over the 1988-1992 period for commercial and
savings banks
10 in France and Spain. It is important to emphasize that, in each country,
banks are competing in the same markets and for the same customers. They have in each
country quite similar access to the capital markets. In Spain and France, financial
innovation and deregulation that generated an increase of competition in the banking
industry appeared during the mid-eighties.
11 Therefore, the period of this study was a
period of rapid technological changes in the production of financial and banking services
during which the banks had to make strategic decisions to adjust to the new environment
and the new competition. In particular, the banks began to reduce the number of employees
and tried to adjust to the new environment in substituting capital for labor, specially in
France.
Only banks that were in existence for all 5 years were kept in the sample. The final
sample used in this study contains 223 French banks and 101 Spanish banks
12.
Variable outputs and inputs.
Table 1 presents the average values of bank outputs and inputs prices (converted in
U.S.dollars)
13 over the period 1988-1992 in each country. We observe that the average
10By the First and Second Banking European Directives, these three categories of banks are now
submitted to the same regulation.
11During these years, new short-term securities were introduced, money market was modernized and it
was left open to non-financial firms, new derivatives markets were created, interest rate controls were
abolished and, finally, capital controls were suppressed.
12Data come from official sources: Anuario de la Confederación de Cajas de Ahorros y del Consejo
Superior Bancario, and Commission Bancaire. For the purpose of this study, the three French largest
banks were excluded of the French sample, as their size would dominate the scale and distort the
estimations. The smallest banks and the foreign banks were also excluded from the French and Spanish
samples.
13All variables initially measured in domestic currencies - including outputs, inputs prices or
environmental variables - were converted into a common currency, following the purchasing power parity
hypothesis. Here, we chose the U.S. dollar.
11size of the total balance sheet and the loans portfolio are very similar. This is due to the
fact that our sample contains a lot of regional medium-sized banks. However, the average
size of deposits differ across countries. One reason is that in France the time deposits
interest rate regulation created an incentive in favor of other liquid investments, such as
investments in mutual funds and money market deposits (the so-called OPCVM). So,
French banks have to substitute money markets liabilities and bonds to time deposits in
order to finance loans.
The prices of inputs differ from one country to the other. In particular, we observe
that both the labor price and the physical capital price are higher in France. This is mainly
the consequence of the differences in the structure and regulation of the labor market and
the real estate markets. However, due to the increase of competition in the deposits markets
in Spain, the average cost of bank liabilities is higher in this country over the period. That
is part of the explanation of the difference in total costs. Indeed, financial costs represent
more than two third of total banking costs in Spain.
12Environmental variables.
The environmental variables selected and used in order to identify the common
frontier are macroeconomic variables as well as variables which explain the peculiar
features of each country banking industry, such as regulatory conditions, banking structure
and accessibility of banking services. We categorised those variables in three groups (Table
2). The first group is called “Main conditions” and includes a measure of the density of
population, the income per capita, and the density of demand of each country. These
indicators describe the main conditions in which banks exert their activities. The density
of population is measured by the ratio of inhabitants per square kilometer. We assume that
banking services supply in areas of low population density would generate higher banking
costs, and at the same time would impede banks to obtain high efficiency levels. On the
other hand, the income per capita of a country--measured as the ratio of Gross National
Product per number of inhabitants--affects numerous factors related to the demand and
supply for deposits and loans. Countries with higher income per capita are expected to have
a banking system that operates in a mature environment resulting in more competitive
interest rates, profit margins and efficiency levels. Finally, the density of demand, measured
by the ratio of deposits by square kilometer, is assumed to be a relevant feature
determining efficiency. Banks which operate in markets with a lower density of demand
would likely incur higher expenses, ceteris paribus.
The second category of environmental variables is called “Bank structure and
regulation” and contains variables describing the structure and regulation of the banking
industry in each country such as the degree of concentration, the average capital ratio, and
the intermediation ratio of the banking industry of each country. The concentration of the
banking industry is measured by the Herfindahl index defined as the sum of squared market
shares of assets of all banks in each country. In analyzing market structure we consider
each country to be a market. Since banks operate exclusively throughout each country and
since entry has until recently been restricted by national borders, a national market is
appropriate. We expect that higher concentration would be associated with higher costs as
well as lower costs. If higher concentration is a result of the market power, concentration
13and costs go in the same way. However, it could be possible that higher concentration
would be associated with lower costs if the concentration is the result of either superior
management or greater efficiency of the production processes. As proxy of regulatory
conditions we define the average capital ratio, measured by equity capital as a fraction of
total assets. Usually, lower capital ratio imply higher risk taking and greater leverage which
could result in increased borrowing costs, leading to lower efficiency levels. The last
variable included into the second group of environmental variables is the intermediation
ratio, defined as the ratio of total deposits over total loans. By using this variable, it is
possible to capture the differences between the two domestic banking industries in terms
of their ability to convert deposits into loans. As higher the intermediation ratio is, as higher
would be the banking industry costs.
Finally, the third category of environmental variables refers to the accessibility of
the banking services for customers, measured by the number of branches by square
kilometer. This variable is used as a measure of branch density that takes in account the
space dimension for each national market. It is also a good indicator of the potential
overcapacity of the branch network in each country. This variable could measure the degree
of competition in the banking market. Indeed, before the banking deregulation of the mid-
eighties, the competition between banks took mainly the form of a non-price competition
and during that period the banks compete by increasing their number of branches. This
non-price competition strategy appeared in France as well as in Spain.
14Table 2 contains the average of the environmental variables over 1988-1992 period
for France and Spain. The arithmetic means of these variables suggest large differences in
terms of the main conditions of banking activities across countries. In particular, the density
of population and the income per capita are higher in France than in Spain. Table 2 also
shows that the density of demand is higher in France than in Spain. So, we could infer
from this information that it could be more costly to run banking activities—that is, to
collect a given level of resources, or to manage a given assets portfolio—in Spain than in
France.
On the other hand, the mean values of the variables belonging to the structure of
banking industry and regulation group show that there are quite important differences in
the bank structure as well as the regulation conditions between France and Spain. In
15particular, the capital ratio is very different. This difference could be due to the fact that
during the period of our study—which precede the effective introduction of the capital ratio
international regulation—the solvency constraints imposed by the Spanish banking
authorities obliged Spanish banks to maintain a higher level of capital ratio, compared to
that of French banks. Another difference between the two domestic banking industries
come from the fact that the intermediation ratio is higher in Spain than in France. That
means that Spanish banks have to collect a higher level of costly deposits (in terms of
operating costs) in order to lend the same amount of loans. In these conditions, it seems
more expensive to exert banking activities in Spain than in France, ceteris paribus.
However, the degree of concentration of the banking industry is quite the same in the two
countries.
Finally, the accessibility of banking services is higher in Spain than in France. That
is consistent with the previous observation concerning the density of population and the
amount of deposits by km
2. So, the conditions in which Spanish banks operate seem
to produce higher level of operating costs. However, again, we should emphasize the fact that
the number of branches could be an indicator of the competition imperfectness in banking
markets.
5. Empirical Results
Our empirical exercise starts with the measurement of efficiency scores of each
French and Spanish banks from its own national frontier—that is, assuming that the
technology used for the banks in each country is different.  These results are summarized
in Table 3. They show that on average the level of efficiency is the same in France and
Spain. This average efficiency level is around 88% over the 1988-1992 period. In other
words, French and Spanish banks are on average equally efficient in their respective
countries. However, given these results, it is not possible to predict what will happen if the
banks would decide to operate in the other country. That is, it is not possible to conclude
whether the French or Spanish banks will reach the same efficiency level in the other
16country than they get in their own country. To answer this question, we have to measure
efficiency scores from a common frontier, and for that purpose we defined the common
frontier by following the traditional approach. We measured the efficiency levels of each
country banks from a common frontier by pooling the data set of the banks of the two
countries, Table 4. The results show that while the average efficiency level of the French
banks appear to be 58%, the Spanish banks are operating with an average efficiency level
of only 9%. This surprising result is in accordance with our assumption that if the country-
specific variables are an important factor in the
then the frontier we build while neglecting this
the inefficiency levels.
explanation of the efficiency differences,
factor will generate an overestimation of
17\
So, in order to build properly the common frontier, we have to take into account
not only the potential differences coming from some country-specific aspects of the banking
technology but also those coming from environmental and regulatory conditions. This
procedure would permit us to verify whether the wide difference of efficiency levels
observed when we use a common frontier without environmental variables comes from a
misspecification of the common frontier, or not. In order to define this common frontier,
first, we tried to select the correct set of environmental variables. That will also help to test
the equality of the technologies used by the two banking industries.
We started with a set of 18 environmental variables. The final set of significant
environmental variables includes 7 variables. Three of them belong to the mean indicators
groups: density of population, income per capita and density of demand. Three other
variables describe the structure of the industry: degree of concentration, average capital
ratio and intermediation ratio. The accessibility of services is measured by the number of
branches per km
2. At the same time, this set allows us to identify the underlying common
banking technology. Indeed, when those environmental variables were introduced in the
separate cost functions of each country and the cross-equation equality restrictions on each
parameter of each country cost frontier were imposed, we verified that most of these
restrictions appeared to be insignificant—as we assumed in a previous section. That
means that not only we have identified the correct set of country-specific environmental
variables, but also the common underlying technology of different countries.
By introducing those variables in the cost equation, holding constant their mean
values for each country, and estimating this common frontier, we obtained correct measures
of banking efficiency level in France and Spain. The results are shown in Table 5. Two
important points should be emphasized about these results. The first is that, on average, the
French banks seem to be more efficient than the Spanish banks. While the French banking
industry reaches an average efficiency score of around 88%, the Spanish banking industry
score is around 75%. The second is that if we compare the results of Table 4 with the
results of Table 5, we can see that the environmental variables play an important role in
the explanation of the differences of the banking costs in France and Spain. When weintroduce those variables in the common frontier, the efficiency levels improve significantly
in both countries.
The influence of the environmental variables seems in general to conform to the
expectations (Table 6). All the coefficients on the environmental variables in the estimation
of the cost function are significant at the 1% level of confidence. That proves the
effectiveness of the role of such variables. First, we consider the role of the “main
conditions” or macroeconomic conditions. Contrary to the expectations, the sign of the
coefficient of the density of population variable is positive. That shows that a higher
density contributes to increase banking costs, instead of to decrease them, as expected. The
reason could come in part from the characteristics of the banking competition. In particular,
if banks compete by opening more branches, for strategic reasons, that could create an
inflation of the bank operating costs. Moreover, in this form of non price competition,
banks should have to open branches in large cities where the real estate is most costly and
the salaries higher. The sign of the income per capita is also positive, which shows that the
higher is the development level of the economy, the higher are the operating and financial
costs that the banks suffer when supplying a given level of services. The sign of the density
of the demand is negative. The explanation could be that it is likely more costly to give
satisfaction to a less important demand of banking services, because that demand is less
informed and less concentrated. Another argument is that a more important demand permits
banks to extract higher scale and scope economies.
19Second, we consider the variables describing the structure and competition of the
domestic banking industry. We observe that the banking costs are increasing with the
degree of imperfection of the banking competition. In particular, the sign of the Herfindhal
index variable is positive. If we take that index as a measure of the market power of banks,
the positive sign tends to demonstrate that higher market power induces banks to spend
more in staff or personal expenses. On the other hand, the sign of the intermediation rate
variable is positive, showing that a greater amount of deposits by unit of loans induce
logically an increase of banking costs. And finally, the sign of the capital ratio is negative
showing that it is less costly to produce banking services if the banks are better capitalized.
As mentioned before, one explanation could come from the existence of a negative
relationship between bank risk and bank borrowing costs.
Third, we consider the accessibility of the banking products for the customers. The
observation shows that the sign of this variable is positive. The lower the density of bank
20branches is, the lower the banking costs are.
All these results could help to explain why Spanish banks are suffering higher costs
and appear significantly less efficient when their average efficiency levels were
obtained without taking into account the environmental conditions. For instance, the higher
number of branches as well as the higher intermediation ratio in Spain compared to France
seem to be the main explanations of the higher bank costs and lower efficiency level in
Spain. Another explanation comes from the lower density of demand. That could create a
cost disadvantage for Spanish banks, as this factor is negatively related to banking costs. On
the contrary, some factors which tend to increase costs are more present in France than in
Spain, as, for instance, the higher level of income per capita or the higher density of
population. However, we have shown previously that these factors reveal the role played
by the imperfections of the competitive process on the banking costs. If it is true that a less
competitive industry tends to increase costs, it is difficult to say which one of the two
banking industries is the less competitive. In fact, our results do not permit us to give a
complete explanation of the banking costs differences between the two countries. They just
verify some current assertions.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we verify that the specific environmental conditions of each country
are an important factor in the explanation of the banking efficiency differences between
French and Spanish banks. Moreover, we show that neglecting these variables could induce
to an important misspecification of the cost frontier and an overestimation of the bank cost
inefficiency.
Estimating a common frontier and using DFA to measure efficiency scores of
French and Spanish banks, our results show that when the common frontier is defined
without environmental variables, the cost efficiency scores of Spanish banks are quite low,
compared to those of the French banks. However, when the environmental variables are
21included in the common frontier these differences are significantly reduced. Moreover, all
environmental variables we include in the specification of the cost function appeared to
exert a significant influence on banking costs and efficiency scores.
Our final results suggest that, on average, French banks seem to be more efficient
than the Spanish banks. Interestingly, this difference in efficiency between countries are
greater when the country-specific environmental conditions are not taken into account.
Moreover, we found that the banks which suffer worst conditions to develop their activities
reach a more significant improvement in their average efficiency scores after incorporating
the influence of these conditions in the measurement of efficiency. Looking at specific-
environmental conditions we observe that Spanish banks operate with a higher number of
branches and higher intermediation ratio, and have lower density of demand than French
banks. Additionally, we found that Spanish banks reach higher improvement in the average
efficiency scores than French banks, when the specific environmental conditions with which
they are operating are taken into account. However, at this stage, our results do not permit
us to give a complete explanation of the banking costs differences between the two
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